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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1995, Governor Lawton Chiles signed Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 168 into law, creating chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida!
Sections two through seven of chapter 95-182 are identified as the "Officer
Evelyn Gort and All Fallen Officers Career Criminal Act of 1995" ("Gort
Act").2 The Gort Act's namesake, Metro-Dade police officer Evelyn Gort
was shot and killed by an armed robber in Coconut Grove, Florida in 1993.
Her assailant, twenty-two year old Wilbur Leroy Mitchell, was a career
criminal with several prior felony convictions.4 State senators, prompted by
Gort's death and responding to the elevated number of crimes committed in
1. S. 168, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995), reprinted in 29 FINAL LEGISLATWE BILL
INFORMATION, at 44 [hereinafter S. 168].
2. Ch. 95-182, § 1, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1665.
3. Florida Legislature, Career Criminal Bill Merits Support, SUN-SETINTL (Fort
Lauderdale), Feb. 19, 1995, at 6G.
4. Id.
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Florida by career criminals,5 introduced the Gort Act as Senate Bill 168.6
The bill was initiated during the 1995 Regular Legislative Session as part of
a comprehensive four-bill crime package.
The Gort Act contains six sections. Section one of chapter 95-182
identifies sections two through seven as the "Officer Evelyn Gort and All
Fallen Officers Career Criminal Act of 1995. ''8 Section two is the heart of
the Gort Act. Section two amends section 775.084 of the Florida Statutes,
which provides enhanced penalties for habitual felony offenders and habitual
violent felony offenders.9 It creates a violent career criminal classification
and establishes enhanced sentencing guidelines for qualifying offenders.'0
The act mandates minimum prison terms for violent career criminals and
requires them to serve at least eighty-five percent of their court-imposed
sentences." It expressly prohibits discretionary early release for violent
career criminals and limits the amount of gain time awards they are eligible
to receive.
12
Section two also establishes the qualifications for sentencing as a
"violent career criminal." 13 First, a defendant must have three prior felony
convictions in Florida as an adult. 4  Qualified offenses enumerated in
section two include any forcible felony and felonies involving violence or
threats of violence such as aggravated stalking and aggravated child abuse.'
5
Convictions that have been set aside by any postconviction proceeding or
pardon are not considered.' 6 Second, a defendant's present felony offense
must be one of the felonies enumerated in section two. 1 Third, a defendant
5. See ch. 95-182, § 4, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1671 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
775.0841 (1995)); STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., FINAL BILL
ANALYSIS & ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. CS/CS/HB 461 & 1885, & COMPANION
BILL CS/SB 168 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter ANALYSIS CS/CS/HB 461 & 1885, &
CS/SB 1681.
6. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-182.
7. Michael Griffin, Senate Gets Tough on Crime, Package Meant to Force Longer
Prison Sentences, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 9, 1995, at 1A.
8. Ch. 95-182, § 1, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1665.
9. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1665-70 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1995)).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1670 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084(4)j)2. (1995)).
12. Id.
13. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
775.084(l)(c) (1995)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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must have been incarcerated in a state or federal prison.18 Fourth, the
defendant must have committed the present felony offense "within 5 years
after the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony or within 5 years
after the defendant's release... from a prison sentence.., imposed as a
result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later."
19
Finally, the defendant must have committed the current felony offense after
October 1, 1995, the effective date of chapter 95-182.
20
Section three of the Gort Act amends section 775.08401 of the Florida
Statutes by requiring state attorneys to adopt uniform criteria for deciding
when to pursue the habitual felony offender, habitual violent felony
offender, and violent career criminal sanctions. Section four amends
section 775.0841, which states legislative findings and intent regarding
career criminals.2 Section five amends section 775.0842 of the Florida
Statutes, which identifies "[p]ersons subject to career criminal prosecution
efforts."2 Section six amends section 775.0843 of the Florida Statutes,
which requires criminal justice agencies to "employ enhanced law
enforcement management efforts and resources for the investigation,
apprehension, and prosecution of career criminals."24 Section seven creates
section 790.235 of the Florida Statutes, making it illegal for violent career
criminals to own or possess firearms.25 Section seven imposes a minimum
sentence of fifteen years imprisonment for individuals convicted of violating
the section.
26
Following certification to the House of Representatives, committee
members in the House amended Senate Bill 168 by adding three sections
27addressing domestic violence. The amendments became sections eight
through ten of chapter 95-182. Section eight amends section 741.31 of the
Florida Statutes, allowing an award of damages for "[a]ny person who
suffers an injury and/or loss as a result of a violation of an injunction for
protection against domestic violence. ' ' Section nine creates section 768.35,
18. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
775.084(1)(c)2. (1995)).
19. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(c)3. (1995)).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 3, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1670-71 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.08401 (1995)).
22. Id. § 4, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1671 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.0841 (1995)).
23. Ch. 95-182, § 5, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1671 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.0842
(1995)).
24. Id. § 6, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1671-73 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.0843 (1995)).
25. Id. § 7, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1673 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 790.235 (1995)).
26. Id.
27. ANALYSIS CS/CS/HB 461 & 1885, & CS/SB 168, supra note 5.
28. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-74 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
2000]
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granting victims of continuing domestic violence a cause of action against
the perpetrator for compensatory and punitive damages.29  Section ten
amends section 784.046 of the Florida Statutes, which establishes the
procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of injunctions for
protection against repeat violence. 30 It enlarges the duties of the clerk of the
court, updates the guidelines for transmission of related information among
law enforcement agencies, restricts the authority to serve or execute
injunctions for protection against domestic violence to specified law
enforcement officers, and enables courts to utilize criminal contempt
proceedings to enforce injunctions for protection against repeat violence.3'
The House amendments are the source of the current constitutional challenge
raised against chapter 95-182.32
The Second and Third District Courts of Appeal of Florida are split
over the constitutionality of chapter 95-182.33 The question raised before the
courts was whether chapter 95-182 violates Article III, section six of the
Florida Constitution, commonly known as the single subject matter rule.34 In
Thompson v. State,35 the Second District Court of Appeal held that chapter
95-182 violates the single subject matter rule, reasoning that the career
criminal and domestic violence provisions of the act constitute two
subjects.36 The court relied on the Supreme Court of Florida's decisions in
Bunnell v. State,37 State v. Johnson, and Burch v. State39 in reaching its
29. Id. § 9, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.35 (1995)).
30. Id. § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674-75 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
31. Id.
32. See Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
33. Id.; Spann v. State, 719 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
34. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316; Spann, 718 So. 2d at 1031.
35. 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
36. Id. at 317. Recently, a nearly identical issue was presented before the First
District Court of Appeal in Trapp v. State. 736 So. 2d. 736 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Trapp involved a single subject challenge to chapter 95-184 of the Laws of Florida. Id. at
737. Similar to chapter 95-182, sections two through 35 of chapter 95-184 address career
criminal sentencing. Id. at 737-38. Sections 36 through 38 of chapter 95-184 are identical to
sections eight through 10 of chapter 95-182. Compare ch. 95-184, §§ 36-38, 1995 Fla. Laws
1676, 1722-24 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046 (1995)), with ch. 95-182,
88 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-75 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046
(1995)). As in Thompson, the First District Court of Appeal determined that the act
"combine[d] criminal penalties with civil remedies." Trapp, 736 So. 2d at 737. However, the
court declined to follow Thompson. See id. at 738-39. Instead, it upheld chapter 95-184
under the controlling authority of Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990), reasoning that
"[a]ll portions of the legislation... deal[t] with remedies for acts which constitute
crimes." Id. at 738. However, the court speculated that the creation of the act may have
involved logrolling and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida. Id. at 739.
37. 453 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984).
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decision.40 The Third District disagreed and in Spann v. State41 upheld
chapter 95-182, rejecting a single subject matter challenge.42 Both courts
acknowledged the conflict.43  The Supreme Court of Florida granted
review.
This comment examines the Second District Court of Appeal's decision
in Thompson.45 Part 11 of this comment illustrates the issue presented in
Thompson, providing background on Article III, section six of the Florida
Constitution. Part III presents the facts of the case, its procedural history,
and the court's holding. Part IV scrutinizes the court's decision.
This comment disagrees with the court's holding for four reasons. First,
the Gort Act relates to the domestic violence provisions in chapter 95-182 by
listing aggravated stalking as a qualified offense for sentencing as a violent
career criminal and habitual violent felony offender. Second, the Thompson
court erroneously characterized the Gort Act as a criminal subject and the
domestic violence provisions as an unrelated civil subject. Third, the chapter
laws invalidated in Bunnell and Johnson are distinguishable from chapter 95-
182. The court also incorrectly distinguished Burch and ignored precedent
supporting a conclusion of constitutionality. Fourth, the legislative history of
the act does not indicate the presence of "logrolling," the legislative practice
sought to be eliminated by the single subject matter rule.
I1. THE SINGLE SUBJECT MATrER RULE
Article 1, section six of the Florida Constitution states, "[e]very law
shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and
38. 616 So. 2d I (Fla. 1993).
39. 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990).
40. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
41. 719 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
42. Id. at 1031, per curiam (relying on Higgs v. State, 695 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997)).
43. See id.; Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
44. See State v. Thompson, 717 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1998). The Florida Constitution
requires the supreme court to hear appeals from decisions of courts of appeal "declaring invalid a
state statute or a provision of the state constitution." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1). It grants the
supreme court discretionary authority to hear decisions of courts of appeal "that expressly and
directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the
same question of law," or decisions "that [are] certified by [a district court of appeal] to be in
direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3),
(4).
45. 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1998).
2000]
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the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."46 Many state constitutions
have similar provisions limiting statutes to a single subect and requiring the
title of a legislative enactment to disclose its subject. The single subject
rule is designed to prevent "the evils of all-inclusive, incongruous, and
disconnected legislation." 48  In State v. Canova,49 the Supreme Court of
Florida identified three specific objectives of the single subject matter rule.5
First, the rule prevents "log rolling legislation." 51 Logrolling is a practice
whereby the legislature combines in one bill several unrelated matters that
individually could not garner legislative support.52  The legislature then
procures the bill's passage by combining the "minorities in favor of each of
the measures into a majority that will adopt them all."53 Second, the rule
prevents fraud and surprise through the careless and unintentional adoption
of provisions in a bill not broached by its title.54 Third, the single subject
matter rule affords the public notice of an act's contents and an opportunity
to be heard thereon.5
Article III, section six only applies to chapter laws. 6 Chapter laws are
acts of the legislature not yet officially published as part of the Florida
Statutes.57 Chapter laws are added to the existing body of state law under
the state's continuous statutory revision program. Acts of the legislature,
signed into law are initially printed as session laws, which are bound and
published as the Laws of Florida.5 9 Following each odd-year legislative
46. FLA. CONST. art III, § 6. The single subject rule contained in article HI, section 16
of the 1885 Florida Constitution is nearly identical to that of the current 1968 Florida
Constitution. Compare FLA. CONST. of 1885, art III, § 16, with FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 6. The
former provision read, "Each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one subject and
matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."
FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 16.
47. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art IV, § 45; MO. CONST. art III, § 23; Oaio CONST. art II,
§ 15(D); OR. CONST. art IV, § 20.
48. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 212 (1955).
49. 94 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1957).
50. Id. at 184.
51. Id.
52. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 212 (1955).
53. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990).
54. See State v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 1957).
55. See id.
56. See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1993).
57. See generally Sandra M. Anderson, Revising: The Process of Statutory Revision
in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1427 (1978) (discussing the importance of statutory revision
in the legislative process).
58. Id. at 1430.
59. Id.
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session, session laws are biennially adopted as part of the Florida Statutes.6°
Once enacted as part of the statute law of the state, "a chapter law is no longer
subject to challenge on the grounds that it violates the single subject
requirement of article Ill, section 6, of the Florida Constitution."61 Therefore,
an individual has standing to raise a single subject matter challenge to a
chapter law if the violation occurred after the law's effective date and before
the date of its reenactment as part of the Florida Statutes.62
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state charged Carol Leigh Thompson with "robbery with a firearm,
a first-degree felony punishable by life, aggravated battery of a victim over
the age of sixty-five, a first-degree felony, and felon in possession of a
firearm, a second-degree felony." 63 All charges are qualified offenses for
sentencing under the Gort Act. The state notified Thompson that it would
prosecute her as a "'habitual felony/habitual violent felony offender/violent
career criminal."' 65  Thompson moved to "preclude her sentencing as a
violent career criminal and to declare unconstitutional chapter 95-182, Laws
of Florida."' ' The trial court denied Thompson's motion.67 Thompson
"entered pleas of no contest to each offense, reserving her right to appeal• ,,68
that denial. The trial court concluded that Thompson was a violent career
criminal and sentenced her pursuant to the Gort Act.
69
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed Thompson's
sentence and declared chapter 95-182 repugnant to Article ll, section six of, • • 70
Florida's Constitution. In its opinion, the court identified two distinct
60. See FLA. STAT. § 11.2421 (1999). Supplements to the Florida Statutes are
published following each regular even year legislative session. 49 FLA. JuR. 2d Statutes § 2
(1984). The supplements contain "the full text of each section amended during that session,
together with the catchlines of sections repealed." Id.
61. Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 2.
62. Id. at3.
63. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 1998).
64. Ch. 95-168, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084
(1995)).
65. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316.
66. Id. Thompson had standing to bring a single subject matter rule challenge to
chapter 95-182. Thompson's offense occurred after October 1, 1995, the act's effective date,
and prior to its reenactment as part of the Florida Statutes on May 24, 1997. See ch. 97-97, §
1, 1997 Fla. Laws 622, 622 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.2421 (1997)).
67. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316.
68. Id.
69. Id. The court sentenced Thompson "to life imprisonment on counts one and two
and to forty years with a thirty-year-minimum mandatory on count three." Id.
70. Id.
20001
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subjects in chapter 95-182--one criminal and one civil.7' According to the
court, the first subject, embodied in sections two through seven, "create[s]
and define[s] the violent career criminal sentencing category and provide[s]
sentencing procedures and penalties. 72 The second subject, contained in
sections eight through ten, addresses "civil aspects of domestic violence. 73
To support its reasoning, the court presented a simplified history of Senate
Bill 168, noting that the Gort Act began as a single bill in the Senate while
sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 originated as three separate bills
in the House of Representatives. 74  These three House bills died in
committee.75  Language from these three bills was engrafted onto two
76separate House bills, one being Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 168.
According to the court, "[i]t is in circumstances such as these that problems
with the single subject rule are most likely to occur. ' 77
The court analogizes the combination of provisions contained in chapter
95-182 to chapter laws struck down by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Johnson and Bunnell.78 In both cases, the court invalidated chapter laws for
violating Article Im, section six of the Florida Constitution. 79 The Thompson
opinion implies that the chapter laws invalidated in Johnson and Bunnell
were struck down because they impermissibly combined criminal and civilI. 80provisions. Concluding that chapter 95-182 impermissibly combines civil
and criminal subjects, the court invalidated it based on the Johnson and
Bunnell holdings. The court resolved that the provisions of chapter 95-182
had "no 'natural or logical connection. ' '8 2 According to the court:
Nothing in sections 2 through 7 addresses any facet of domestic
violence and, more particularly, any civil aspect of that subject.
71. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
72. Id. at 316.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 317.
76. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317. The language from these House bills was also
engrafted onto Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 172, which became chapter 95-184. See
1995 Fla. Laws cl. 95-184. Chapter 95-182 and chapter 95-184 contain identical domestic
violence provisions. Compare ch. 95-182, §§ 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-75 (codified
at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046(9) (1995)), with ch. 95-184, §§ 36-38, 1995 Fla.
Laws 1676, 1722-24 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046 (1995)). See Trapp
v. State, 736 So. 2d 736,737-38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
77. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
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Nothing in sections 8 through 10 addresses the subject of career
criminals or the sentences to be imposed upon them. It is fair to
say that these two subjects "are designed to accomplish separate
and dissociated objects of legislative effort."8 3
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Construction of the Single Subject Matter Rule
The single subject matter rule is the source of numerous constitutional
challenges to chapter laws. The difficulty facing the courts when presented
with single subject challenges is determining what exactly constitutes a
single subject. This task is complicated by the reality that bills passed by the
legislature contain numerous provisions, the result of complex transactions
and tradeoffs that result in compromised legislation.84 In response, the
courts have developed a framework within which single subject challenges
to chapter laws are examined.
As noted, Article Ell, section six of the Florida Constitution requires
that "[e]very law.., embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."85 Courts
afford the legislature great deference when enacting laws,86 and will resolve
every reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality.8 7 The courts will not
declare an act unconstitutional unless it is invalid beyond a reasonable
doubt.88 Nevertheless, the courts continually reiterate that the provisions of
an act must have a "natural or logical connection" in order to pass
constitutional muster.8 9 In Canova, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
the provisions of an act must be "fairly and naturally germane" to its
subject.90 An act's provisions must be "necessary incidents to or tend to
make effective or promote the objects and purposes of legislation included in
the subject."91  Courts state that the provisions of an act must not
83. Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 163 So. 270, 283 (Fla. 1935)).
84. Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutues in the
Shade, 82 COLUM. L. Rv. 1752, 1763 (1982) (reviewing GUIDo CALABRsL A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATLFI'ES (1982)).
85. FLA. CONST. art III, § 6.
86. See, e.g., Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1990).
87. See, e.g., State v. Kinner, 398 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1981).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 1991).
90. State v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 1957).
91. Id.
2000]
9
Kopas: Thompson v. State: Does Chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, Violate
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
"accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort., 92 This
test is based on "common sense."
93
Acts of the legislature are said to have subjects and objects. 94 In
Spencer v. Hunt,95 the Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the two
concepts as follows:
The "subject" of an act is the matter to which it relates; the
"object" is its general purpose. Although the two terms are held to
be equivalent by some authorities, the better view is that the word
"subject" is a broader term than the word "object," as one subject
• • 96
may contain many objects.
In Board of Public Instruction v. Doran,97 the Supreme Court of Florida
established that "[t]he term 'subject of an act' . . . means the matter which
forms the groundwork of the act and it may be as broad as the Legislature
chooses as long as the matters included in the act have a natural or logical,,98
connection. This is a crucial distinction as Article I, section six requires
laws to be singular in subject, not object. The single subject rule does not
prohibit a statute from containing many provisions, nor does it require the
embodiment of every thought of the legislature in a different statute.99 An
examination of chapter 95-182 within this context reveals that all of its
provisions naturally and logically relate to the single subject of repeated
criminality. 1°°
B. The Sections of Chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida
The Second District Court of Appeal's holding is partially based on its
deduction that nothing in the Gort Act, which is comprised of sections two
through seven of chapter 95-182, "addresses any facet of domestic
violence."10' However, the court's deduction is inaccurate. In actuality, the
92. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
93. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987).
94. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 217 (1955).
95. 147 So. 282 (Fla. 1933).
96. Id. at 284 (citing Exparte Heman, 77 S.W. 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903)).
97. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
98. Id. at 699.
99. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 218 (1955).
100. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 3, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643
(Fla. 1999) (No. 92-83 1).
101. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 1998).
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Gort Act does address a facet of domestic violence-aggravated stalking. 02
The act addresses aggravated stalking on two occasions. First, section two
of chapter 95-182 lists "[a]ggravated stalking, as described in s. 784.048(3)
and (4)" of the Florida Statutes as a qualified offense for sentencing as a
violent career criminal. 103 Second, section two amends section 775.084 of
the Florida Statutes by adding aggravated stalkin as a qualified offense for
sentencing as a habitual violent felony 
offender.g
Section 784.048(4) of the Florida Statutes defines the crime of
aggravated stalking as follows:
Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat
violence pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection
against domestic violence pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other
court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person or
that person's property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense
of aggravated stalking .... 105
The definition of aggravated stalking includes conduct occurring after
violation of an injunction for protection against domestic violence.lub The
title of section eight of chapter 95-182, which created section 741.31 of the
Florida Statutes, is a "[v]iolation of an injunction for protection against
domestic violence.9' 7  It enables domestic violence victims to secure
damages for injuries resulting from breach of an injunction. 108  The
definition of aggravated stalking in section 784.048(4) of the Florida
Statutes also includes conduct occurring after a violation of an injunction for
102. Brief of Appellee at 1, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (No. 96-02517). The argument that aggravated stalking connects the various sections of
chapter 95-182 was the foundation for the state's case in the Second District Court of Appeal
of Florida. Id. The state presented this same argument before the Third District Court of
Appeal in Higgs v. State, which upheld the constitutionality of chapter 95-182. Id. at 2; Higgs
v. State, 695 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997). In its Initial Brief on the Merits in
the Supreme Court of Florida, the State incorporated this argument as part of its analysis of
the sections of chapter 95-182. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 16, State v.
Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999) (No. 92-831).
103. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084
(1995)).
104. Id.
105. FA. STAT. § 784.048 (1999) (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
108. Id.
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protection against repeat violence. 1' 9 Section ten of chapter 95-182 governs
the issuance and enforcement of injunctions for protection against repeat
violence. 110 Thus, sections eight and ten of chapter 95-182 relate to the
crime of aggravated stalking. Collectively, sections eight through ten of
chapter 95-182 relate to the crime of aggravated stalking because the
definition of domestic violence, which is contained in section 741.28(1) of
the Florida Statutes, specifically lists aggravated stalking as a qualifying
offense."'
When chapter 95-182 amended section 775.084 of the Florida Statutes,
it listed aggravated stalking as a qualified offense for sentencing as a violent
career criminal and added aggravated stalking as a qualifying offense for
sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender.!12 Thus, the legislature's
inclusion of aggravated stalking as a qualifying offense for both violent
career criminals and habitual violent felony offenders connects the Gort Act
to sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182.113
The Thompson court identified two distinct subjects in chapter 95-
182-one criminal and one civil. 114 According to the court, sections one
through seven "create and define the violent career criminal sentencing
category and provide sentencing procedures and penalties."" 5  The court
held that sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 address "civil aspects
of domestic violence." 6 Based on its characterization of these provisions as
"civil" and "criminal," the court concluded that they have no natural or
logical connection." 7 However, the court's description of sections eight
through ten is inaccurate. They are criminal statutes.
Sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 address various aspects of
domestic violence.1 8  Section 741.28(1) of the Florida Statutes defines
domestic violence as "any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated
battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking,
kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical
109. FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (1999).
110. Ch. 95-182, § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046
(1995)).
111. FLA. STAT. § 741.28(1) (1999).
112. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1666-67 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 785.084
(1995)).
113. Brief for Appellee at 1, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1998) (No. 96-
02517).
114. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
115. Id. at 316.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 317.
118. Ch. 95-182, §§ 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-74 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046 (1995)).
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injury or death of one family or household member by another who is or was
residing in the same dwelling unit." 119 The Florida Statutes identify each
offense enumerated in section 741.28 as either a felony or misdemeanor.'2
Felonies and misdemeanors are crimes. Likewise, domestic violence, which
may encompass any one or a combination of these offenses, is also a crime.
In addition, the legislature expressly stated "that domestic violence [should]
be treated as a criminal act rather than a private matter."'121 Despite the
court's characterization, sections eight through ten clearly have a criminal
orientation.
Sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 provide restitution for
victims of repeat criminal behavior.12 Restitution is a remedy designed to
compensate a victim for damage or loss caused by a defendant's criminal
offense.'13 Restitution is statutory and may come from the state in the form
of governmental assistance to innocent victims of crime, or directly from the
responsible perpetrator.124
In Spivey v. State z5 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
purposes of restitution are "to compensate the victim, [and] ... serve the
rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the criminal justice
system."' 6 The court stated that "restitution is a criminal sanction."12 7
Damages awarded to individuals injured as a result of a breach of an
injunction against repeat violence, and compensatory and punitive damages
awarded for injuries resulting from continuing domestic violence, clearly
may be characterized as restitution since they require "the convicted
defendant [toj'pay' for [his] crime by making financial compensation to the
victim ....
All the sections of chapter 95-182 relate to the single subject of repeat
criminal behavior. It is clear that the Gort Act is an attempt to abate
recidivism since habitual felony offenders and violent career criminals are
by definition repeat criminals. Conceivably, the threat of longer
incarceration will dissuade many from a return to crime. The domestic
violence provisions of chapter 95-182 also are an attempt by the legislature
119. FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (1999).
120. Id. §§ 784.01, .011, .02, .021, .03, .045, .048.
121. Id. § 741.2901(2).
122. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 13, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643
(Fla. 1999) (No. 92-831).
123. 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 2754 (1993).
124. Id. § 2740.
125. 531 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1988).
126. Id. at 967.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. GERALD D. ROBIN, INTRODUCION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: PRINCIPLEs,
PROCEDURE, PRACrICE 604 (2d ed. 1984).
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to dissuade repeated criminality. A repeater is a person who "commit[s]
crime and [is] sentenced, and then commit[s] another and [is] sentenced
again. 129 Under Florida law, any family or household member who is the
victim of domestic violence has standing to file a petition for an injunction. .. .. 130
for protection against domestic violence against the perpetrator. Domestic
violence is a crime. 131 When the perpetrator breaches that injunction, he
commits a misdemeanor of the first degree. 132 Misdemeanors are crimes.
133
Thus, one who breaches a protective injunction is a repeater since he
committed the crime warranting the injunction, and then committed a second
crime by breaching the injunction. Section eight of chapter 95-182 is an
attempt to abate such breaches, and in turn control repeat criminality through
the deterrent effect of restitution. 34 Likewise, section nine attempts to
prevent repeated incidents of domestic violence by providing damages to
victims "who [have] suffered repeated physical or psychological injuries
over an extended period of time....,,135 Section ten endeavors to control
repeated criminality by enabling the courts to utilize criminal contempt
proceedings to force compliance with injunctions for protection against
repeat violence.1
36
C. The Applicability of Bunnell v. State and State v. Johnson
Once one identifies an act's subject, the court must find a natural and
logical relationship between the act's components. The Thompson court
relied on Bunnell and Johnson to invalidate chapter 95-182.137 However, the
chapter laws voided by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bunnell and Johnson
are distinguishable from chapter 95-182.
Bunnell presented a challenge to chapter 82-150. '8 Section one of
chapter 82-150 created the crime of obstruction of justice by knowingly
giving false identification to a law enforcement officer.139 Sections two and
three of the act changed and reduced the membership of the Florida Council
129. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990).
130. FLA. STAT. § 741.30(1)(a) (1999).
131. Id. § 741.2901(2).
132. Id. § 741.31(4)(a).
133. Id. § 775.08(4).
134. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
135. Id. § 9, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.35 (1995))
(emphasis added).
136. Id. § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
137. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1998).
138. Bunnell v. State, 453 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 1994).
139. Id.
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on Criminal Justice. 14 The Bunnell court invalidated chapter 82-150
reasoning that "the subject of section 1 has no cogent relationship with the
subject of sections 2 and 3 and that the object of section 1 is separate and
disassociated from the object of sections 2 and 3.'141
Chapter 95-182 differs significantly from chapter 82-150. Chapter 95-
182 has a single subject-repeated criminality.1  Sections two through
seven are designed to control criminal behavior through the embellishment
of criminal penalties. 143  Sections eight through ten attempt to abate
recidivism through the retributive and restitutional qualities of civil damage
remedies. 144 In contrast, the provisions of chapter 82-150 were attenuated.
Section one of chapter 82-150 was a prototypical criminal provision
designed to subordinate criminal behavior and expedite criminal
investigations. However, sections two and three of chapter 82-150 could be
described best as managerial or governmental. These sections are quite
clearly designed to accomplish completely different objects of legislative
effort. Adjusting the membership of a bureaucratic agency could impact
criminal behavior in only a superficial way.
Likewise, the chapter law invalidated by the Supreme Court of Florida
in Johnson is distinguishable from chapter 95-182. Johnson involved a
challenge to chapter 89-280.146 The first three sections of the act amended
sections 775.084, 775.0842, and 775.0843 of the Florida Statutes pertaining
to "habitual felony offenders," "career criminal prosecutions," and "policies
for career criminal cases.''V However, "[s]ections four through eleven of
the act pertain[ed] to the Chapter 493 provisions governing private
investigation and patrol services, specifically, repossession of motor vehicles
and motorboats."' The court held that the provisions of chapter 89-280 had
no cogent relationship, rejecting the state's argument that the two provisions
140. Id.
141. Id. The rationale of Bunnell is somewhat flawed. The court identified two
distinct subjects in chapter 82-150, then concluded that that the two subjects have no cogent
relationship. Id. However, since Florida's constitution mandates every law to be singular in
subject, a law with two subjects would be per se unconstitutional. Thus, once the court
reasoned that the act had two subjects, it was superfluous to determine their relationship.
142. Bunnell, 453 So. 2d at 809.
143. See ch. 95-182, §§ 2-7, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1665-73 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
775.084, .08401, .0841, .0842, .0843, 790.235 (1995)).
144. See id. §§ 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1673-74 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31,
768.35, 784.046 (1995)).
145. See Johnson v. State, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1993).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id.
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relate to the broad subject of crime control.149 According to the court, the
,150
act "addresses two very separate and distinct subjects."
Unlike the provisions in chapter 89-280, the provisions in chapter 95-
182 have a natural and logical relationship. The inclusion of aggravated
stalking as a qualified offense for sentencing as a violent career criminal and
habitual felony offender links the Gort Act to sections two through ten of
chapter 95-182."l The definition of aggravated stalking includes conduct
occurring after violations of injunctions for protection against domestic
violence and repeat violence. 52 Section eight of chapter 95-182 allows
domestic violence victims to secure damages for injuries resulting from a
violation of a domestic violence injunction. 5 3  Section ten amends the
procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of injunctions for
protection against repeat violence. 54 Collectively, the domestic violence
provisions of chapter 95-182 relate to the Gort Act because all are efforts to
control repeat criminal behavior.' 55  All sections of chapter 95-182 are
necessary incidents to and promote the aim of controlling repeat criminal
behavior. 56 In sharp contrast, the provisions of chapter 89-280 have no
relationship other than a scant association with crime control.1 7 As the
Johnson court noted, "[n]o reasonable explanation exists as to why the
legislature chose to join these two subjects within the same legislative
act."
158
D. Burch v. State and the Wide Latitude Afforded the Legislature by the
Courts in the Enactment of Laws
In Burch v. State, 59 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld chapter 87-
243 of the Laws of Florida against a single subject attack. Chapter 87-243
was a comprehensive piece of crime control legislation. In all, the act
contained seventy-six sections, amending, creating, and repealing over
149. Id.
150. Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 4.
151. Brief of Appellee at 1, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (No. 96-02517).
152. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(4) (1999).
153. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
154. Id. § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
155. See 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-182.
156. Id.
157. 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-280.
158. Johnson v. State, 616 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1993).
159. 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990).
160. Id. at 3.
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seventy Florida statutes.161 The act addressed an array of topics including
standards and schedules of controlled substances, abatement of nuisances,
aircraft registration practices, improvement districts and enterprise zones,
safe neighborhoods drug testing, and drug abuse education in primary and
secondary schools.162 The court held that each area "bear[s] a logical
relationship to the single subject of controlling crime .... , 63 6
The Thompson court distinguished the chapter law upheld in Burch.1
The court noted that chapter 87-243 had an extensive preamble in which the
legislature detailed the purpose of the act and explained the relationship
between its parts.165 According to the preamble, the legislature drafted
chapter 87-243 as an "urgent and creative remedial action" to combat a
crime rate crisis. 166 The legislature stated that it enacted a comprehensive
law in order to avoid fragmented, duplicative legislation. 167 The courts apply
the single subject matter rule less stringently to comprehensive legislation
provided an act combats a stated crisis and the legislature explains the
relationship between its parts. 168  Comparing Burch, the Thompson court
seems to fault chapter 95-182 for not having an explanatory opening
statement. 169 However, chapter 95-182 is not comprehensive legislation like
that in Burch. Comprehensive means "including much, comprising many
things, having a wide scope, [and] inclusive."1 0- Chapter 95-182 does not
address an expansive subject like crime control. It is relatively narrow
legislation designed to abate recidivist criminal behavior through increased
criminal penalties and civil remedies. No explanatory preamble is necessary
to explain the natural and logical relationship between multifarious
provisions.
"Prior comprehensive enactments by the legislature demonstrate that
widely divergent rights and requirements can be included without challenge
161. 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-243.
162. Id.
163. Burch, 558 So. 2d at 3.
164. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
165. See id.
166. 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-243.
167. Id.
168. Cf. State v. Leavins, 599 So. 2d 1326, 1334 (Fla. 1992). In State v. Leavins, the
codrt invalidated chapter 89-187 of the Laws of Florida on the ground that it violated the
single subject rule. Id. at 1335. The court identified 22 subjects in the act ranging from gas
lease regulation, hunting stamp fees, oyster licenses, and license plate taxes. Id. at 1333-34.
The court rejected the state's argument that the provisions of the act related to the general
topic of environmental resources. Id. at 1334. "[Sluch a finding would not, and should not,
satisfy the test" under the single subject rule. Id. at 1335.
169. See Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
170. 8 WoRDs AN) PHRAsEs 444 (1951).
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in statutes covering a single subject."'171 On numerous occasions the courts
have rejected single subject challenges to chapter laws containing diverse
provisions. In Smith v. Department of Insurance,172 the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld the 1986 Tort Reform and Insurance Act against a single
subject challenge. 7 3 The court identified five discrete parts to the act.174 The
legislation included copious long term insurance and tort reforms, and
temporary insurance reforms. 175 It also created an insurance law and tort
reform task force, and 'modifie[d] [the] financial responsibility requirements
applicable to physicians. ' 176 The court rejected the appellee's contention
that the act impermissibly combined civil litigation and tort reform.7 The
court held that civil litigation and tort reform have a natural and logical
relationship to the legislature's express objective of making low cost liability
insurance available.17
In State v. Lee, 179 the Supreme Court of Florida held that a
comprehensive chapter law did not violate the single subject rule because it
reformed tort laws, automobile insurance laws, and assessed additional fines
for various traffic offenses.18 The court stated that the single subject rule
"is not designed to deter or impede legislation by requiring laws to be
unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation.' In Chenoweth v.
Kemp,1 82 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld chapter 76-260 against a
single subject challenge. Chapter 76-260 "covers a broad range of
statutory provisions dealing with medical malpractice and insurance ....,.184
The court summarily upheld the law, stating that tort litigation and insurance
reform have a natural and logical connection.
185
171. State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276, 282-83 (Fla. 1978).
172. 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
173. Id. at 1083.
174. Id. at 1085-87.
175. Id. at 1085.
176. Id. at 1086.
177. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1087.
178. Id.
179. 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978).
180. Id. at 282.
181. Id.
182. 396 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1981).
183. Id. at 1124.
184. Id.
185. Id. Chief Justice Sundberg criticized the Chenoweth majority. Id. at 1126-27.
Sundberg characterized chapter 76-260 as a "haphazardly formulated and disjointed" piece of
legislation "ranging over almost the entire insurance field." Chenoweth, 396 So. 2d at 1124.
According to Sundberg, if chapter 76-260 "passes constitutional muster, one is hard put to
envision a chapter which would not." Id. at 1127. Nevertheless, the courts consistently cite
Chenoweth with approval. See Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1990); Smith v.
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The provisions contained in chapter 95-182 are nowhere near as
extensive as those in Burch, Smith, Lee, and Chenoweth. The court in each
case reiterated and reaffirmed the proposition established by Board of Public
Instruction v. Doran186 that an act "may be as broad as the Legislature
chooses provided the matters included in the law have a natural and logical
connection." 187 Each decision is highly illustrative of the great deference
afforded the legislature by the judiciary.
E. The Legislative History of Chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida
When faced with a single subject matter challenge to a legislative act,
Florida courts often will examine its legislative history. In this context,
legislative history means the "history of the evolution" of the statute. As a
general rule, courts may properly look to legislative history where statutes
are challenged "because the object to be accomplished is prohibited or a
prohibited route is selected to reach a permissive destination."190
The Gort Act was introduced in the Senate on March 7, 1995 as Senate
Bill 168.191 The Senate certified the bill to the House on March 8, 1995,
where it entered containing only the Gort Act provisions. 192 As stated
previously, House members amended the bill by adding three sections
addressing domestic violence. 93 These amendments became sections eight
through ten of chapter 95-182. The language in sections eight through ten
originated in three separate House bills: House Bill 1251, House Bill 1789,
and House Bill 2513. But all three bills died in committee. 94  The
Thompson court opined that the legislative history of Senate Bill 168
Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1085 (Fla. 1987); State v. Leavins, 599 So. 2d 1326,
1334 (Fla. 1st Dist, Ct. App. 1992).
186. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
187. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276, 282 (Fla. 1978).
188. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1998).
189. 73 AM. JuR. 2D Statutes § 150 (1974).
190. Id.
191. S. 168, supra note 1.
192. Brief for Appellee at 9, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1998) (No. 96-
02517).
193. S. 168, supra note 1.
194. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON JUDICIARY FINAL BILL ANALYSIS & ECON.
IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. PCS/HB 1251 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter ANALYSIS
PCS/HB 1251]; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON JuDIcIARY FINAL BILL ANALYSIS &
ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. PCS/HB 1789 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter
ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1789]; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS REVISED BY THE COMM. ON AGING
& HUMAN SERVIcEs FINAL BILL ANALYSIS & ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. HB 2513
(Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter ANALYsIs HB 2513].
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indicates the presence of logrolling.195  Thompson asserted that the
legislature "took advantage of the popular public furor [surrounding Gort's
death] to slip... pet bills into" Senate Bill 168.196 However, the legislative
history presented by the Thompson court to support its conclusion is
oversimplified. The complete legislative history of chapter 95-182 discounts
the inference of the presence of logrolling.
The Final Bill Analysis of House Bill 1251 indicates that it contained
six sections.197  The bill amended sections 741.29 and 741.2902 of the
Florida Statutes by inserting legislative intent regarding services for victims
of domestic violence and requiring courts to consider making perpetrators
attend batterers intervention programs 98 Section three of House Bill 1251
amended section 741.30 of the Florida Statutes, enlarging the duties of the
clerk of the court with respect to protective injunctions, and authorizing
certain law enforcement officers to serve those injunctions.' 9 Section four
of House Bill 1251 amended section 741.30 of the Florida Statutes by
enlarging the offense of violation of an injunction for protection against
domestic violence to include contacting the victim by telephone, and going
to the victim's home, school, or place of employment. 2 W Section five of the
bill amended section 784.046 of the Florida Statutes.201 Similar to section
three, section five enlarged the duties of the clerk of the court and law
enforcement officers with respect to protective injunctions. Section six of
House Bill 1251 provided the effective date.202
Of House Bill 1251's six sections, the House only borrowed languae
from section five.20 3 Section five became section ten of chapter 95-182. E
Thus, the legislature did not engraft the substance of House Bill 1251 onto
Senate Bill 186 as the Thompson court suggests.205 Instead, the legislatureincorporated only a fraction of the House Bill 1251's language.
195. See Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Initial
Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at 18, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999) (No.
92-831).
196. Answer Brief for Respondent on the Merits at 31, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d
643 (Fla. 1999) (No. 92-831).
197. ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, supra note 194.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, supra note 194.
203. Compare ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, with ch. 95-182, § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665,
1774 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
204. Compare ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, with ch. 95-182, § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665,
1774 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
205. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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The House also incorporated domestic violence language from House
Bill 1789.206 The Final Bill Analysis of House Bill 1789 illustrates its
connection to Senate Bill 186. It notes that "the current definition of
domestic violence does not include stalking and aggravated stalking."
M
House Bill 1789 "broaden[ed] the definition of domestic violence" by
adding, inter alia, aggravated stalking to the definition of domestic
violence.0 The bill added aggravated stalking because the offense is
"prevalent in domestic violence cases." 2 9 The Final Bill Analysis also
reveals that House Bill 1789 "enhance[d] the already existing domestic
violence law" by adding "aggravated stalking to the list of crimes which
qualify an offender for sentencing as an habitual [violent felony]
offender." 210 Thus, it appears that the legislature recognized a relationship
between aggravated stalking, habitual offenders, and domestic violence prior
to amending the Gort Act. This suggests that the legislature did not "logroll"
domestic violence provisions from House Bill 1789 onto the Gort Act.
Instead, it simply added provisions it always considered germane to the
habitual offender statute.
The House also borrowed language from House Bill 2513.211 The
substance of House Bill 2513 became section nine of chapter 95-182.
212
House Bill 2513 provided, inter alia, civil remedies for victims of violators
of injunctions for protection against domestic violence. 3 Domestic
violence is a crime that enables victims to obtain protective injunctions
214against the perpetrator. Since violation of an injunction for protection
215
against domestic violence is a misdemeanor of the first degree, those who
breach protective injunctions are repeat offenders. House Bill 2513 clearly
was an attempt by the legislature to contain such recidivism through the
deterrent effect of civil remedies. The Gort Act, with its enhanced penalties
for habitual felony offenders and violent career criminals, is also an attempt
to contain repeat criminal behavior. Since both bills dealt with repeat
criminality, it was natural and logical for the legislature to combine House
Bill 2513 and Senate Bill 168 into one act.
206. ANALYSIS PCS/HB 197, supra note 194. House Bill 1789 incorporated
recommendations found by the Governor's Task Force on Domestic Violence. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. ANALYSIS PCS/IHB 197, supra note 194.
211. See ANALYSIS HB 2513, supra note 194.
212. Compare ANALYSIS HB 2513, with ch. 95-182, § 9, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1674
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.35 (1995)).
213. See ANALYSIS HB 2513, supra note 194.
214. See id.
215. FLA. STAT. § 741.31 (1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida does not violate Article H,
section six of the Florida Constitution. An examination of its provisions
reveals that each addresses the single subject controlling repeat criminal
behavior. The cases relied on by the Thompson court to invalidate chapter
95-182 are distinguishable. Chapter 95-182 is not comprehensive
legislation. No explanatory preamble is needed to explain the correlation
between its parts. On the contrary, it is relatively narrow legislation akin to
numerous chapter laws previously upheld by the Florida courts. The
legislative history of chapter 95-182 discounts any suggestion of logrolling
and reveals a natural and logical relationship between its parts.
Statutory interpretation is complicated by the fact that "words in
statutes have multiple meaning. 216 Traditionally, it has been the role of the
judiciary to ascertain the meaning of indeterminate statutory language and
develop tests to ascertain the lawful boundaries of those statutes. Court
decisions interpreting the single subject rule illustrate the difficulty of
statutory construction and the challenge of defining a single subject.
America's body of law continues to move further away from the common
217law, becoming increasingly statutory. Acts of the legislature tend to be
conglomerations of provisions born of multifarious sources. They are the
product of debate and compromise. As the law becomes increasingly more
statutory, single subject rule challenges to legislative acts may comprise a
larger segment of future court dockets.
VI. ADDENDUM
On December 22, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida published its
218decision in State v. Thompson. In a per curiam opinion, the majority held
that chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida violated the single subject matter
rule. 9 In its opinion, the court assimilated most of the reasoning of the
Second District Court of Appeal.Y The majority adopted the Second
District's observation that nothing in the Gort Act "addresses any facet of
domestic violence" and that "nothing in sections eight through ten [of
chapter 95-182] addresses the subject of career criminals or the sentences to
216. L.H. LaRue, Statutory Interpretation: Lord Coke Revisted, 48 U. PrrT. L. REV.
733, 733 (1987).
217. See generally, Abner J. Mikva, Reading & Writing Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV
627 (1987) (describing the difficulties of statutory interpretation).
218. 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999).
219. Id. at 649.
220. See id. at 648.
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be imposed upon them."'21 It analogized chapter 95-182 to chapter laws
invalidated in Johnson and Bunnell.m The court concluded that the
legislative history of chapter 95-182 indicated the presence of logrolling.2
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Wells adopted the reasoning of the
First District Court of Appeal in Trap v. State, which upheld chapter 95-
184 against a single subject attack. Justice Wells concluded that all
portions of the chapter 95-182 dealt with remedies for criminal acts, and
therefore the subject of the act is crime prevention.225 The dissent reiterates
the strong presumption favoring the constitutionalityof a statute, and the
wide latitude afforded the legislature by the courts. Justice Wells also
noted that "three district courts out of the four which have ruled on this issue
have found the statute sustainable against the one-subject challenge."227
According to Justice Wells, "the decisions in favor of constitutionality by
these three district courts, at the very least, demonstrate that the statute is not
unconstitutional.2'n
In its opinion, the majority took cognizance of a jurisdictional split
regarding the window period within which an individual had standing to
raise a single subject rule challenge to chapter 95-182.2 9  The Second
District Court of Appeal concluded that the window period for bringing a
single subject matter challenge to chapter 95-182 was between October 1,
1995, the law's effective date, and May 24, 1997.230 The court concluded
the latter date was the date of its reenactment as part of the Florida
Statutes.23 1 However, while Thompson was pending before the Supreme
Court of Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided Salters v.
State. 2 2 In Salters, the Fourth District concluded that the window period
expired on October 1, 1996.2 3 The Supreme Court of Florida, however,
declined to reach a decision on this matter because Thompson's offense,
which occurred on November 16, 1995,234 fell within either period.235 Thus,
221. Id. (quoting Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998)).
222. Id.
223. Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 646.
224. Id. at 649.
225 Id.
226. Id. at 650.
227. Id.
228. Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 650.
229. Id. at 646.
230. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
231. See id. (citing 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-97).
232. 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
233. Id. (citing Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
234. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316.
235. Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 646.
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the window period in which an individual has standing to raise a single
subject matter challenge to a chapter law is presently unresolved.
Ivan J. Kopas*
* The author wishes to thank Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General,
Tampa, Florida, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, Florida for their
assistance.
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